American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2019

An Irrevocably Tainted Opinion: Zen's Threat to Public Discourse
Andrew F. Popper

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Law Commons

Boston College Law Review Electronic Supplement. Fall 2019

Essay
An Irrevocably Tainted Opinion: Zen’s Threat to Public Discourse
Andrew F. Popper1
That agency decision makers must be objective, fair, and impartial is hardly debatable. It
is equally obvious that a challenge to objectivity must be supported by actual evidence, not
assumptions of prejudgment or bias, before the extreme step is taken to exclude a decision maker
from those responsibilities delegated to them by Congress.2 This essay criticizes Zen Magnets v.
Consumer Product Safety Commission3 (Zen), a Colorado Federal District Court opinion that

1

Andrew Popper is the Bronfman Professor of Law and Government at American University,

Washington College of Law. This essay benefited greatly from the research and writing of Amy
Lin, J.D., a 2018 graduate of the Washington College of Law.
2

Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Justice Scalia’s Memorandum Order

clarifying that while comments or friendships may suggest prejudgment or bias, the presumption
due those in decision making roles is one of fairness and objectivity, not condemnation based on
supposition); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-48 (1975) (agency decision makers are entitled
to a presumption of honesty and integrity).
3

Zen Magnets v. CPSC, No. 17–cv–02645–RBJ, 2018 WL 2938326 (D. Colo. June 12, 2018),

2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97904; Case history: Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 841 F.3d 1141, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21000 (10th Cir., Nov. 22, 2016) (finding the
record in the Zen adjudication insufficient to determine whether CPSC met the substantial
evidence test required to uphold their determination).
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failed to follow the well-worn path that requires a presumption of honesty, integrity, and good
faith4 for administrative actors.
Zen is a judicial review of a Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
determination5 that certain small rare-earth magnets Zen produced constituted a “substantial
product hazard”6 capable of causing internal bleeding and death.7 After acknowledging that the
fact-finding and substantive conclusions made by the CPSC were supported by substantial
evidence, the court shifted gears. Instead of concentrating on the alleged risk and necessity of a
recall the agency deemed necessary to protect consumers, the court fixated on a comment made

4

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-48 (1975) (agency decision makers should be accorded a

presumption of integrity and good faith).
5

In the Matter of Zen Magnets, LLC., Final Decision and Order, CPSC, C.P.S.C. 12-2 (2017),

available at: https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/pdfs/recall/lawsuits/abc/163--2017-1026%20Final%20Decision%20and%20Order.pdf?Tme8u5fRF2.29_B.i4Ix7pPwb_whKng2
6

15 U.S.C. 2064(a)(1)(a substantial product hazard determination is the predicate for a product

recall, requires that the manufacturer or producer of the product in question receive an
adjudicatory proceeding where substantial evidence must be presented that demonstrates “a
substantial risk of injury to the public. . . .”).
7

Author’s note: This essay in no way is intended to assess, judge, evaluate, or characterize the

quality, worth, safety, value, or appropriate uses of Zen’s rare earth magnets.
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by CPSC Commissioner Robert Adler in a rulemaking,8 an entirely separate proceeding.9 That
comment, the court found, required a remand to CPSC, nullified the recall, and excluded
Commissioner Adler from further participation in this case.10 Commissioner Adler’s words, the
court held, reflected an “irrevocably closed mind”11 compromising Zen’s due process right to an
impartial decision maker. This action presumptively put the public at risk and denied

8

15 U.S.C. 2064(a)(2) (prior to the issuance of a rule specifying needed warnings or changes to a

product, the CPSC must show the product is unreasonably unsafe, a very different standard than
“substantial product hazard”).
9

That comment, made in a separate proceeding, should have been dispositive; instead, that

critical fact was deemed of no real consequence to the Zen court. Marine Shale Processors, Inc.
v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 81 F.3d 1371, 1385 (5th Cir. 1996) (a prior conclusion in one setting
does not prevent a decision maker from making a subsequent fair and impartial determination
based on all evidence).
10

This essay addresses exclusively the Colorado Federal District Court opinion, referenced in

footnote 3, a decision that excluded Commissioner Robert Adler from participation in the
CPSC/Zen Magnets proceeding, supra note 5. It is not intended as a comment, criticism, or
recommendation regarding prior, pending, or subsequent litigation involving Zen Magnets.
11

Id at *37 (“[O]ne of the Commissioner's statements demonstrated an irrevocably closed mind,

or at the very least the reasonable appearance of having prejudged the key issues in Zen's
appeal.”)
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Commissioner Adler, a fair-minded and distinguished agency official, the right and
responsibility to participate in this important case.
As a preliminary matter, the standard "irrevocably closed mind" is rarely used to judge an
agency official in an enforcement action or adjudication similar to the Zen case. It is more
commonly to assess bias in rulemaking.12 Further, in those instances where that standard is used,
the term is not “irrevocably closed mind” but rather “unalterably closed mind.”13 More
importantly, the core of the holding in Zen is predicated on an assumption of mistrust, the exact
opposite assumption mandated by the Supreme Court.14 Were this approach to become the
norm, it would chill the essential discourse between agency officials and the public,
unnecessarily formalize agency process, and increase the likelihood of uninformed enforcement
or regulation.
Zen was the product of two separate regulatory actions, a fact practically ignored by the
District Court and, in most instances, dispositive of the question of prejudgment.15 The first was

12

Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168-70 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

13

C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, Jr., 931 F.2d 1556, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Prof'l Air Traffic

Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ass'n of
Nat. Advertisers, Inc. v. F.T.C., 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
14

Withrow, at 47 (agency actors in an adjudicatory role are entitled to a “heavy presumption of

honesty and integrity….”).
15

Robert R. Kuehn, “Bias in Environmental Agency Decision Making,” 45 Envtl. L. 957, 990

(2015) (“having decided the same or a similar case against a party does not disqualify an
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the 2012 enforcement action16 alleging that Zen’s rare earth magnets were a substantial product
hazard17 and should be recalled.18 The second was a CPSC rulemaking, also initiated in 2012,
finalized in October 2014, going into effect in April 2015,19 and remanded back to the agency in
2016. That rule, if finalized, would be applicable to Zen’s magnets as well as any other company
producing a similar product. It was during the course of an open meeting discussing that

administrative law judge from later deciding the case on remand or rehearing . . . . Even a
statement of tentative conclusions based on evidence submitted prior to a hearing is permitted,
provided the decision maker still has an open mind and considers all evidence presented.”).
16

In the Matter of Zen Magnets, LLC., Final Decision and Order, CPSC, C.P.S.C. 12-2 (2017),

available at:
https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/pdfs/recall/lawsuits/abc/163--2017-1026%20Final%20Decision%20and%20Order.pdf?Tme8u5fRF2.29_B.i4Ix7pPwb_whKng2.
17

15 U.S. Code § 2064(a)(1) (CPSC has the power to compel a product recall only when it finds

the presence of a substantial product hazard).
18

Zen Magnets, LLC; Complaint, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,823 (Aug. 10, 2012).

19

Final Rule: Safety Standard for Magnet Sets, 79 Fed. Reg. 59,962 (Oct. 3, 2014) (to be

codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1240); Matthew Howsare and Shawn Skolky, CPSC’s Zen Magnets
Mandatory Recall Reversed: A Mixed District Court Decision Gives Zen Magnets a New Life
and the CPSC Favorable Precedent for Mandatory Recalls, MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS,
GLOVSKY, AND POPEO (June 14, 2018), https://www.mintz.com/insightscenter/viewpoints/2171/2018-06-cpscs-zen-magnets-mandatory-recall-reversed-mixed-district.
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proposed rule,20 not the enforcement action that is the subject of the Zen case discussed herein,
that Commissioner Adler made the following statement:
The conclusion that I reach is that if these magnet sets remain on the market irrespective
of how strong the warnings on the boxes in which they’re sold or how narrowly they are
marketed to adults, children will continue to be at risk of debilitating harm or death from
this product.21
The following clarification of this statement, also a matter of public record, was ignored
and unquestioned by the court:22 “I repeat what I said at the staff briefing; each proceeding
carries different factual elements and different standards of proof, but each provides all parties

20

Supra note 9; 5 U.S.C. 553(c).

21

See Zen Magnets, 2018 WL 2938326 at *12. (Commissioner Adler’s conclusion was based on

extensive documentation of this point by CPSC technical staff in the agency’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. According to CPSC staff, “[we] do not believe warnings will ever be
effective in protecting children from this hidden hazard.” Similarly, “[we] doubt that even wellwritten warnings would substantially reduce the incidence of magnet ingestions.” See Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 53781, 53794 (September 4, 2012)).
22

Zen Magnets v. CPSC, No. 17–cv–02645–RBJ, 2018 WL 2938326 at *14 (D. Colo. June 12,

2018).

Boston College Law Review Electronic Supplement. Fall 2019
with the entire set of due process23 rights. . . .”24 This declaration of a commitment to due
process includes the obligation to assess evidence objectively in the enforcement action – and
absolutely nothing from the record in that proceeding suggests any other behavior, interpretation,
or state of mind.25 In fact, the court actually found that the CPSC had given Zen a chance to
“provide unique evidence and testimony . . . to dissuade the Commission,” and that the
Commissioners’ minds were not “irrevocably closed,” and that there had been “no violation of
Due Process.”26
Turning a blind eye to the best evidence of Commissioner Adler’s state of mind, the
public record, the Zen Court concluded the following:

23

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (one of many cases finding that the due

process clause, referenced by Commissioner Adler, presupposes a fair and impartial tribunal).
24

Statement of Commissioner Robert Adler on the Consumer Product Safety Commission

Approval of Publication of A Final Rule on Certain High-Powered Magnet Sets (September 29,
2014) submitted and part of the public record in this case in “Affidavit” CPSC Docket No. 12-2
by Shihan Qu (Mat 16, 2016).
25

Hearing Transcripts, at 71 and again at 81, display a concern for the evidence and invited

Zen’s counsel to proffer evidence to support the proposition that the product in question was safe
– hardly the kind of thing one would do if they had an irrevocably closed mind.
26

Zen Magnets v. CPSC, No. 17–cv–02645–RBJ, 2018 WL 2938326 (D. Colo. June 12, 2018),

2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97904, slip op, 35-36.
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[Commissioner Adler’s] view that warnings or marketing could not mitigate the risks
associated with the magnets would have affected the outcome of the adjudication
regardless of the legal standard applied. . . . Commissioner Adler’s statement [in the
rulemaking] rendered Zen’s participation [in the adjudication] futile, since his mind was
irrevocably closed on a key factual question of the efficacy of warnings or marketing.”27
Ignoring the public record, the District Court launched into a critique of Commissioner
Adler, labeling him inflexible, close-minded, and unwilling and unable to assess evidence in the
enforcement action – all unsubstantiated findings28 based on a momentary “appearance of bias,”
supposition, and presumption.29 That standard is simply wrong.30 Allowing a court to remove a

27

Zen Magnets v. CPSC, No. 17–cv–02645–RBJ, 2018 WL 2938326 at *14 (D. Colo. June 12,

2018).
28

Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1947) (finding no

reason for disqualifying examiners from rehearing a case because they ruled strongly against a
party in the first hearing); Peter L. Strauss, “Disqualifications of Decisional Officials in
Rulemaking,” 80 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 993-94 (1980) (a statement of opinion in a rulemaking
does not necessarily disqualify a decision maker from making a fair and impartial determination
in an adjudication).
29

Id.

30

Even for administrative law judges who are in a role more closely resembling Article III

judges, the “appearance” standard the Zen court used is incorrect. In Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336
F.3 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003), the court discussed the general rule of recusal for ALJs found at
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sitting agency commissioner based on nothing but a subjective interpretation of an “appearance”
is an invitation to judicial interference with agency action on a frightening scale.31 Accordingly,
real evidence, e.g., reliance on thoroughly discredited testimony and/or ignoring irrefutable
evidence, not reference to one offhand comment in a separate proceeding, is mandated.32
Among many other things, what makes the District Court’s analysis so disturbing is its
failure to recognize that the standards for rulemaking and adjudication are significantly different
at CPSC. When it comes to rulemaking, the Commission must determine that a product presents
an unreasonable risk of injury. When it comes to adjudicating that a product presents a
substantial product hazard, the Commission has a substantially higher burden to meet. In the
latter case, the Commission must also prove that the product’s unreasonable risk of injury
“creates a substantial risk of injury to the public.”33 The fact that Commissioner Adler opined in
a rulemaking that high-powered magnets present a risk of injury to the public notwithstanding a

20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.940 holding that “nothing in this regulation mandates recusal for the mere
appearance of impropriety.” [emphasis added] (Section 404.940 reads: “An administrative law
judge shall not conduct a hearing if he or she is prejudiced or partial with respect to any party or
has any interest in the matter pending for decision.)
31

Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 351, 356 (1957) (limiting removal power of the President so

that commissioners can act without the “Damocles sword of removal” hanging over them).
32

Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 623 P. 2d 151, 158 (Cal. 1981).

33

15 U.S.C. § 2064(a)(1).
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warning printed on the package in which they are sold in no way led to or required a later finding
that they presented a substantial product hazard in an adjudication.
Commissioner Adler has been a Commissioner at CPSC for the last decade. His is an
unblemished record of fairness and objectivity and one statement in a separate proceeding (that
is, in fact, a summary of agency staff fact-finding34) cannot and must not be the basis to conclude
he is committed to anything other than fairness in the decision-making process.35
Beyond the wholly inappropriate psychoanalysis implicit in the challenge to honesty and
integrity in Zen, there is a failure to recognize the import of such a finding or the legal
background on which such an onerous conclusion rests. Suffice it to say that assumptions based
on a sentence in a rulemaking, refuted subsequently in word and deed, do not meet any test

34

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 53781, 53794, 59975 (September 4, 2012)

detailing finding by the CPSC staff that the danger these product present simply cannot be
ameliorated by a warning. See supra, note 18 (explaining that Commissioner Adler’s conclusion
was amply documented in the CPSC record).
35

United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941) (agency decision makers "are assumed to

be [people] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy
fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. . . ."; In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651
(2nd Cir. 1943). (per Jerome Frank) (if "’bias’ and ‘partiality' be defined to mean the total
absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no
one ever will.").
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contemplated for this most critical judgment of a committed and dedicated public servant. The
District Court owed Commissioner Adler more.
The Supreme Court addressed succinctly this precise question decades ago in the Cement
Institute case: "No decision of this Court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of
procedural due process for a judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an opinion as to
whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law.”36 [emphasis added] There was no
reason for the court in Zen to ignore this clear and binding instruction.
Zen is one of a small number of cases that have considered excluding a sitting
commissioner from a critical decision making role. In Cinderella Career & Finishing School v.
FTC, the court considered whether FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon should have recused himself
from a case because of a rash of public statements indicative prejudgment.37 The Cinderella
School court pointed out that “individual Commissioners [do not have] license to prejudge cases
or to make speeches which give the appearance that the case has been prejudged.”38 However,
this was not the first time Chairman Dixon had been chastised39 and his comments were made as
part of a “campaign” replete with press releases.

36

F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702-703 (1948).

37

Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. F.T.C., 425 F.2d 583, 584–85 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

38

Id. at 590.

39

Id. (“It is appalling to witness such insensitivity to the requirements of due process; it is even

more remarkable to find ourselves once again confronted with a situation in which Mr. Dixon,
pounding on the most convenient victim, has determined either to distort the holdings in the cited
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In contrast, in Zen, Commissioner Adler’s statements were not part of any campaign
against an industry practice, not evidence of a repetitive pattern reflecting prejudgment, made
during a separate legal proceeding, made on the record allowing refutation (as opposed to the
press release used by Chairman Dixon), based on staff findings, not based on prejudgment or
bias, and then, also on the record, followed by remarks making clear Commissioner Adler’s
acute and accurate sense of his responsibility to assess all facts objectively.
As noted earlier, the legal standard to assess bias on which Zen relies is “irrevocably
closed mind,” while the more common term is “unalterably closed mind.” Given that the stakes
for the entire system of administrative justice couldn’t be higher, wording matters. Was it fair to
conclude that one who says on the public record that they are committed to due process and an
objective assessment of fact has an unalterably – or irrevocably – closed mind? A conclusion of
this magnitude cannot rest on assumptions or appearances. It must be predicated on “clear and
convincing evidence,”40 a review of the best available evidence, not supposition readily refuted
by actions and public pledges.
In Association of National Advertisers v. FTC, the DC Circuit held that an “agency
member could be disqualified from proceeding only where there was clear and convincing

cases beyond all reasonable interpretation or to ignore them altogether. We are constrained to
this harshness of language because of Mr. Dixon's flagrant disregard of prior decisions.”).
40

Ass'n of Nat. Advertisers, Inc. v. F.T.C., 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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showing that he had an unalterably closed mind in matters critical to disposition of the
rulemaking . . . .”41 [emphasis added]. This standard was not met in Zen.
C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, Jr. reaffirms Association of National Advertisers, finding that:
“[A]n individual should be disqualified [in that case, a rulemaking] ‘only when there has been a
clear and convincing showing that . . . member has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical
to the disposition of the proceeding.’”42[emphasis added]. In Mississippi Commission on
Environmental Quality v. EPA, the court reaffirmed that standard, relying on the Air Transport
Association of America.43 The Air Transport court found that this most consequential
determination had to be based on evidence that the decision maker has “an ‘unalterably closed
mind’ and [is] ‘unwilling or unable’ to rationally consider arguments.”(citations omitted).”44
The opposite appears to have happened in Zen which reflects a rush to judgment that was unfair,
unjustified, and dangerous.

41

Id.

42

C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, Jr., 931 F.2d 1556, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

43

Air Transport Association of America, Inc. v. National Mediation Board, 663 F.3d 476, 398

U.S. App. D.C. 314 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
44

Mississippi Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. E.P.A., 790 F.3d 138, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015) citing Air

Transport Association of America, Inc. v. National Mediation Board, 663 F.3d 476, 487 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
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Relying on C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox,45 the Mississippi Commission case held that a
statement a rulemaking is hardly clear and convincing evidence of bad faith in an adjudication.
“[A]n individual should be disqualified . . . only when there has been a clear and convincing
showing that the ... member has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition
of the proceeding.”46 Sensitive to the chilling effect, the Mississippi Commission court
cautioned: “We would eviscerate the proper evolution of policymaking were we to disqualify
every administrator who has opinions on the correct course of his agency's future actions.”
(citation omitted).47 That essential caution was absent in Zen. The threshold finding for
“unalterably closed mind” is high: clear and convincing evidence.48 In Zen, the evidence in the
adjudication is actually the opposite; a statement in a separate proceeding directly refuted by the
declarant is simply not clear or convincing evidence of a closed mind.
Another legal standard used by courts to determine prejudgment is “irrevocable taint.”
The question is whether the conduct of the decision maker is so egregious that it taints or colors
irrevocably the proceeding in which the behavior takes place. Since the behavior in question did
not happen in the adjudication, it is hard to see how that proceeding was tainted. That standard
was central to the decision in Air Traffic Controllers v. FLRA, where the court considered,

45

Mississippi Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. E.P.A., 790 F.3d 138, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015), quoting

C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1564 (D.C.Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46

Id. at 183–84.

47

Id. at 184.

48

Organized Fishermen of Fla., Inc. v. Franklin, 846 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
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“whether . . . the agency's decision-making process was irrevocably tainted so as to make the
ultimate judgment of the agency unfair, either to an innocent party or to the public interest that
the agency was obliged to protect.”49 One interaction, particularly in a public forum – and in a
separate case – is just not enough.
It is neither logical nor fair to assume that a simple statement made in a rulemaking,
based on staff findings, taints irrevocably a subsequent enforcement action. A finding of this
nature cannot be based on a “gotcha” moment, a comment dredged up from a public meeting in
another proceeding. Too much is at stake. To compromise an entire regulatory action,
presumptively placing the public at risk, and tarnish the reputation of a distinguished public
official on such a limited observation (hardly a finding of anything) is regrettable at best.
In Hasie v. Office of Comptroller of Currency of U.S., the court found a challenge of this
nature must “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity [for] adjudicators’ and must
‘convince [the court] that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses . . . a
risk of actual bias or prejudgment [such] that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of

49

C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, Jr., 931 F.2d 1556, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991) Prof'l Air Traffic

Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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due process is to be [fulfilled].’”50 Zen does not begin to meet this test.51 Commissioner Adler’s
statement and unblemished record do not meet this test.
Conclusion
The ramifications and downstream hazards of sanctioning decision makers are obvious
and significant. Were Zen seen as the correct legal standard, it would undermine the system of
administrative justice, erode public confidence in agency action, and demonize legions of
committed and talented public servants who, in good faith, share their perspectives on matters
agencies must address. The goal is to keep open channels of communication, encourage
commentary and public discourse, not chill and suppress those vital means of governance.
Consider the language on which courts rely for the rare and solemn task of silencing a
public official: unalterably closed mind or irrevocable taint. These are potent phrases meant to
address the most obvious and egregious actions that compromise the vital task of objective
assessment of fact. They require conduct that leaves no doubt that an agency actor has literally
shut down any willingness to undertake their assigned task. Anything less than that would
wrongfully impugn the character, honesty, and good faith efforts of scores of agency decision
makers. If followed by other courts or agencies, Zen would threaten critical components of
administrative justice. For that reason, Zen belongs on the precedential scrap heap of well-

50

Hasie v. Office of Comptroller of Currency of U.S., 633 F.3d 361, 367–68 (5th Cir. 2011).

51

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, (1975) (before excluding a decision maker, there must be

evidence of “actual bias or prejudgment” so egregious “that the practice must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.”).

Boston College Law Review Electronic Supplement. Fall 2019

intended but deeply problematic cases. The Zen opinion, in the final analysis, is itself
irrevocably tainted.

